with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading." 10 Elsewhere, Barthes notes that plaisir "is linked to a consistence of the self, of the subject, which is assured in values of comfort, relaxation, ease." 11 In the translator's introduction to Image, Music, Text, Stephen Heath elaborates further on plaisir's relation to subjectivity, noting that it is "linked to cultural enjoyment and identity, to the cultural enjoyment of identity, to a homogenizing movement of the ego."
12 Plaisir, then, is the pleasure of identifying with, and submitting to, a text's socially accepted (dominant) meanings, and as such, it involves "conforming to the dominant ideology and the subjectivity it proposes."
13

The Assault on Pleasure and Emergence of Ideological Criticism as Stereotype
In the preceding account, pleasure is a conservative force-a virtual guarantee of the status quo, of existing power relationships. It is a product of audience passivity and the acceptance of ready-made meanings (ideology). Little wonder, then, that during the ideological awakening of the 1960s, the pleasure associated with media consumption would come under attack from Marxists, feminists, and other segments of the Left. 14 In his 1963 essay, "The Fate of Pleasure," American literary critic Lionel Trilling wrote that, "We are [today] repelled by the idea of an art that is consumerdirected and comfortable." 15 Such repulsion was also evident in the writings of the Frankfurt School, which held a broadly disapproving view of pleasure. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno claim that, "Pleasure always means not to think about anything. … Basically it is helplessness. It is flight; not, as is asserted, flight from a wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance." 16 Perhaps the most famous critique of the pleasures of media, though, is Laura Mulvey's essay, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," originally published in the autumn 1975 issue of Screen.
Mulvey's essay, which has been widely anthologized in feminist, film, and media readers since its initial publication, is important not simply because of its visibility, but because it explicitly takes up matters of pleasure. In a section titled, "Destruction of Pleasure as a Radical Weapon," Mulvey argues that the visual pleasure afforded by Hollywood cinema works to create subjectivities that (re)affirm the dominant patriarchal order. 17 Using psychoanalytic theory, she sets out to destroy the visual pleasure of mainstream cinema. Explains Mulvey, "It is said that analyzing pleasure, or beauty, destroys it. That is the intention of this article. The satisfaction and reinforcement of the ego that represent the high point of film history hitherto must be attacked." 18 A key point that is often overlooked in readings of Mulvey's essay, however, is that she is not opposed to pleasure qua pleasure. What Mulvey opposes is the pleasure that serves to reinforce hegemony-what has been identified as plaisir. Indeed, she argues that there is a need to find a new space of pleasure, a space with which she continuously flirts in her essay.
To understand how Mulvey's essay began to open a new space of pleasure (one that liberates the subject, rather than constrains it) and how that space has slowly been collapsed by the media scholarship since then, we need to consider another essay-one that appeared three years earlier, Stuart Hall's "Encoding/Decoding." At the time of its initial publication in 1972, Hall's essay reflected a significant challenge to the orthodox views concerning meaning in media studies. It challenged the "transmission models," which privileged the message source, and introduced ideology into the equation. For Hall, audiences could decode messages in one of three ways (or from one of three positions): dominant, negotiated, or oppositional. Since both the dominant and negotiated positions acknowledge, according to Hall, "the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand significations," these reading positions are the ones likely to interpellate audiences as subjects and hence deliver plaisir. 19 Oppositional reading, by contrast, recognizes and resists the ideological hail to subjectivity; it "detotalizes the message" and thus destroys plaisir. 20 But that de(con)struction of dominant meaning/ideology/pleasure is itself a mode of (re)construction, of production, and of pleasure. What Mulvey accomplishes, then, in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" is an oppositional reading of mainstream film. As a critic myself, I imagine that the moment Mulvey first produced that reading had to be almost unimaginably freeing and pleasurable. She was, at that very moment, rewriting the whole of film history, and even more fundamentally rewriting herself. In that moment, I imagine that Mulvey escaped the "control of culture and of meaning." 21 Oppositional reading, it would seem, carried with it the promise of a new space of pleasure, one that was highly resistive, if intensely personal. But that promise was never fully realized. Just as the space for a new pleasure was opening, two forces converged to collapse it. First, subsequent media scholarship coded oppositional reading as "work" rather than "pleasure." Second, oppositional reading fell victim to method and, in many cases, succumbed to stereotype. It is worth considering each of these developments and their consequences in greater depth. Although there are numerous essays in media studies that use the language of "work" or "labor" to describe the activity of oppositional reading, I want to focus on one in particular that utilizes the "work" metaphor. Published as the lead essay in Critical Studies in Mass Communication in June 1989, Celeste Michelle Condit's "The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy" is specifically addressed to assessing the potential of oppositional reading to function as a liberating pleasure. Toward this end, Condit studied the responses of two viewers to a Cagney & Lacey episode that concerned abortion; one viewer, Jill, "was positioned to give a reading of the text that was dominant or only slightly negotiated," and the other, Jack, "was required to provide a largely oppositional reading." 22 Based on their verbal and nonverbal responses to open-ended questions about the episode, Condit contends there is a "disproportional pleasure for oppositional and dominant readers" in which oppositional reading imposes "oppressive quantities of work." 23 Condit concludes, therefore, that one of the key factors constraining audiences from shaping "their own readings, and hence their social life" is "the ratio between the work required and pleasure produced in decoding a text." 24 Condit's conclusion is flawed, however, because it is based on a one-dimensional conception of pleasure that devalues "the pleasure of oppositional reading" by coding it as "work." Condit observes a disproportional pleasure in her two viewers because pleasure is conceptualized exclusively in terms of plaisir. 25 Given that plaisir is linked to a comfortable practice of reading, it comes as no surprise that, "Jill indicated she enjoyed the episode of Cagney & Lacey very much … and her nonverbal responses indicated a restful, enjoyable experience." 26 Plaisir is a conservative pleasure not because it always (re)produces a conservative ideology, but because it is comfortable and comforting. Jill experiences pleasure (specifically plaisir) because she is effectively interpellated by the (liberal) discourse of the episode. Jack, however, reads the episode oppositionally-a practice that destroys plaisir, as is evident in his response. "Jack's interpretation require[d] more time and space, and visibly more effort (his nonverbal behavior was frequently tense and strained) … [and] was more difficult than the accommodative response was for Jill." 27 Although Jack's reading clearly demonstrates a lack of plaisir, it is difficult to imagine that his struggle to argue against the text's invited ideology was not its own mode of pleasure, as it is often the struggles that require the most effort, the most strain, that deliver the most intense pleasures. 28 But Condit has no vocabulary for describing or analyzing this mode of pleasure, so it is dismissed as "work." The metaphor "oppositional reading is work" has been, I believe, a damaging one in media studies, particularly in terms of a critical pedagogy.
For years, I unreflectively used this language in my Critical Media Studies class. Over the course of the semester, I would present students with an array of oppositional codes and invite them to do the "work" of critical consumption. Every so often, a student would come to me and ask, "Do you still enjoy media?" The question always surprised me because I really do enjoy media and my critical engagement with it. So, I began to think about where the question comes from, and I realized that in teaching students to read oppositionally, I was destroying the only type of pleasure (plaisir) with media they had ever known, without furnishing them a language for the pleasure that derives from breaking with culture. Students skillfully and dutifully generated oppositional readings, but it always appeared to be more out of "duty" (to me and the class) than pleasure. And there was a second, related problem. One of the strengths and important insights of Condit's essay is that oppositional reading is not always a Leftist discourse. But over time, it has come to be associated principally (if not exclusively) with the Left. Obviously, no single piece of scholarship is responsible for this, but it is helpful to examine in some detail a particular essay to understand how this discourse came to dominate the field. Thus, I turn to another lead essay from Critical Studies in Mass Communication, Linda Steiner's "Oppositional Decoding as an Act of Resistance" from the March 1988 issue. In this essay, Steiner argues that "when submitting insulting advertisements and clippings from various mass media for republication in [the "No Comment" section of] Ms., readers are engaging in oppositional decoding"-an act that resists "dominant power structures." 29 As the argument unfolds, however, Steiner silently elides two very different categories of reading practices. In the article's abstract (quoted above), "readers" refers to those persons who submit and thus presumably locate insulting messages. When such messages are read from a feminist perspective in their original (patriar-chal) contexts, the reading is, indeed, oppositional. But throughout the essay, Steiner repeatedly conflates these readers with the general readership of Ms. magazine. "As the expressive organ of a group dedicated to social change that is predicated on the basis of oppositional readings of dominant practices," when Ms. magazine (re)publishes and thereby recodes those messages in its pages, a feminist reading is no longer oppositional, but in Hall's terms "preferred" (dominant). 30 The readers of Ms. magazine who immediately understand the patriarchal character of the messages published in "No Comment" are not producing resistive readings. They may be participating broadly in some form of social resistance, but their readings are, in that context, neither resistive nor oppositional. This conflation of reading practices is problematic, as it perpetuates the misguided assumption that "oppositional readings continually contest the dominant ideology," in which the "dominant ideology" is always understood to be conservative (patriarchal) . 31 But what is dominant ideology if not "precisely the idea insofar as it dominates: ideology can only be dominant." 32 In the local context of "No Comment," patriarchy is not the prevailing ideology. What this essay fails to make clear is that oppositional reading is not resistive to a particular ideology, but of ideology in general. Oppositional reading is transgressive precisely because it is a break with, a momentary evasion of, ideology.
The repeated failure of critical media studies scholarship to highlight this distinction has had several consequences. Among the most pernicious is the reduction of ideological criticism today first to formula, then to repetition, and finally to stereotype. The danger of "language in a purely stereotyped manner," writes Barthes, is that "it leaves the door wide open for ideology, because stereotype and ideology share an identity." 33 Ideological criticism, or rather the language of ideological criticism, is stereotypical in at least two senses today: its object and approach. With few exceptions, ideological criticism of media still respects its object of study as an artistic whole, as the original creation of an Author. 34 Media scholars may speak of texts and textuality, but rarely study "Texts" (in the poststructuralist or Barthesian sense of this term). Their object of fascination continues to be the "work"-a finished, stable, classifiable object. Critics analyze "films" and "television shows" and then, more narrowly, "horror films," "action-thrillers," and "romantic comedies." Critics respect, which is to say, they naturalize these mediums, these genres, these categories, which all come from culture, but act surprised when Will and Grace reinforces hegemony. The hegemony lies no more in the show, than in the critic who blindly accepts these categories. How can a critic who studies film and allows a particular ideology to establish all the parameters (i.e., medium, genre, form, author, message, audience) expect to find anything other than that ideology through and through? 35 When media critics and teachers read a film or television show oppositionally, beginning and ending with an unquestioned acceptance of what constitutes the discourse (the object of study), the practice of oppositional reading is transformed from an attitude of disruption and dissolution of subjectivity into a restrictive method and corresponding prescription of subjectivity. Say, for instance, I invite a student to undertake an oppositional reading of The Man Show on Comedy Central.
To the extent that the culture of the television industry is patriarchal, every television show that AOL/Time-Warner produces will, to great extent, embody that ideology. Since the very categories of "network television" and "entertainment variety show" were conceived of within a patriarchal discursive formation, each of the individual shows generated within those categories will bear traces of that ideology. An oppositional reading, therefore, will necessarily be one that diametrically opposes the ideology of patriarchy. This may appear liberating at first glance, but now the reading practice rather than the structure of the television show guarantees/ authorizes the "preferred" subject position. Oppositional reading simply replaces The Man Show as the site of ideological constraint. The ideological critic who begins and ends with a "television show" as her/his object of study will find only the so-called "dominant" ideology. Moreover, this critic will produce a subjectivity as finished and as beyond question as that of the viewer who submits to the text and its pleasures (plaisir); it will simply be its ideological opposite. It is this state of opposites, of either/or, of closed and coherent subjectivities that fuels my boredom. But how do we rupture this structure without simply creating another in its place? In the hopes of finding an answer, I turn to Roland Barthes and the notion of jouissance.
Pleasure and the Poststructuralist Barthes
Roland Barthes is certainly no stranger to media studies. His work on myth is widely known and cited, and no graduate seminar in media studies would be complete without, at least, a gesture to his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" and Elements of Semiology when discussing structuralism and semiotics. 36 "For many, to this day," observes Mireille Ribière, "the name of Barthes is synonymous with structuralism." 37 But this is not the Barthes that concerns us here. Sometime during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Barthes's thinking and writing took a dramatic poststructuralist turn. 38 After some twenty years of revealing myths and uncovering the deep structures of meaning in messages, Barthes began to ask questions about readers, about how they take their pleasures, and about how they make, unmake, and remake their subjectivities. Barthes was himself acutely aware of this shift, which he reflected upon during an interview conducted in 1972:
For a long time I wrote mostly ideological criticism: Mythologies, for example, and Critical Essays. These days, the chores of ideological criticism have been taken up to a certain extent by everyone [in France]. It is not avant-gardist work; there is much redundancy and mere verbiage in ideological criticism, as it is practiced by students, for example. … [The task of dissecting ideology] has already been taken up by a whole section of the French intelligentsia, while a theory of pleasure, on the contrary, is waiting for constructive, combative action. Why is this the case? … Politicized language takes its terminological and phraseological models from a generally Marxist theoretical literature, which naturally excludes the problem of pleasure. Speaking frankly, it seems to me that in much of the counter-ideological work being done in France today, work that is indeed necessary, there is nevertheless a law, a censorship, a foreclosure of pleasure. 39 Although Barthes's comments concern the state of literary studies in France in the 1970s, they resonate, I argue, with an eerie poignancy for the current state of media studies in the US. Hence, it is worth attending closely to Barthes's writings on pleasure in the hopes of gleaning some insights for contemporary critical practice.
Barthes's theory of pleasure, and more specifically his notion of criticism as pleasure, is rooted in the Lacanian concept of jouissance. For Lacan, as well as for Barthes, "Jouissance goes beyond plaisir. … Jouissance begins where pleasure [plaisir] ends." 40 The concept is an especially difficult one to explain, however, as the French word jouissance has no English equivalent. Typically, jouissance is translated into English as "bliss," but as Heath explains, "the success of this is dubious … since not only does 'bliss' lack an effective verbal form (to render the French jouir [meaning 'to come']), it also brings with it connotations of religious and social contentment ('heavenly bliss', 'blissfully happy') which damagingly weaken the force of the original French term." 41 Jouissance is an intense, orgasmic, and even violent form of pleasure, 42 but unlike plaisir, which is merely a state, jouissance is also an action, a moment of production. It embodies the idea, offers Patrick Fuery, "that the critical moment should also be a point of ecstasy in which the idea has orgasmic force." 43 As with plaisir, jouissance is closely tied to matters of subjectivity. But whereas the pleasure that derives from consumption (plaisir) is gratifying in its "confirmation of existing identity," the pleasure of production (jouissance) results in "an ecstatic loss of previous being." 44 According to Barthes, "[Jouissance] unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his [sic] tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language; [it] is the system of reading, or utterance, through which the subject, instead of establishing itself, is lost." 45 It is the capacity of jouissance to radically disrupt the unity of subjectivity that associates the term with loss as well as with pleasure. But precisely how does jouissance affect this "mode of vanishing, of annulment of the subject," 46 and how, in turn, does this loss of self open the space for what Robert L. Ivie has called "productive criticism"? 47 To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine Barthes's "Theory of the Text," for, as he notes, the Text "is bound to jouissance."
48
Approaching the Text
For Barthes, the Text is a metaphor-one that describes a particular attitude or perspective toward language. This perspective is quite distinct, he maintains, from the prevailing attitude toward language, which he refers to as the "work." Perhaps the greatest difference (in attitude) between Texts and works is in where they locate the activity of writing. 49 Works respect the sovereignty of the Author-God. They privilege the signified, and though they allow for the possibility of a plural signified, it is always a limited plural. 50 The work closes down writing, closes down textuality, by imposing limits on reading and by creating the appearance of a finished discourse. The work, in perpetuating the illusion that it is finished (i.e., produced by a singular voice), always directs the reader or critic toward a prescribed-already "scribed," already written-meaning or meanings. The reader and critic both arrive at the same meaning for a work; they simply arrive there differently. The reader's path, unconscious, delivers plaisir; the critic's path, conscious, annihilates it. The reader's path reproduces myths and ideologies; the critic's path exposes them. But the "work" positions both readers and critics as relatively passive receivers. 51 The phrase "passive receivers" is, of course, redundant since reception (consumption) can only be passive; it produces nothing. Even critical consumption (i.e., oppositional reading as practiced by contemporary ideological critics) is a form of passivity. 52 Here, method merely replaces the work and its Author as the textual Father, as the guarantee of meaning, ideology, and subjectivity. In approaching television, film, and music as "works," contemporary critical media studies lacks both pleasure and productive (create[ive]) insight, not because it destroys plaisir, but because it represses jouissance.
The Text, in stark contrast to the work, begins with the "removal of the Author." 53 It conceptualizes discourse as "a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash … as a tissue of quotations," and it locates the reader as "The space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost." 54 Thus, explains Vincent Leitch, "the text is opened out and set going-produced-by the reader in an act of collaboration, not consumption." 55 When discourse is no longer received, when the whole disciplining apparatus of the Author-God is disrupted, then and only then does Text production become "the primary task of audiences, readers, and critics." 56 Indeed, Barthes contends that "the Text is experienced only in an activity of production." 57 The Text privileges the infinity of the signifier, which "is not simply to say that it has several meanings, but that it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely acceptable) plural." 58 As such, Michael Moriarty notes, "The Text, like the erotic, suspends our sense of ourselves as unified subjects: we have no secure identity as receivers of a message, for there is no message; we cannot relate to its discourse, for we do not know who is speaking and are confronted with bottomless possibilities of irony; the multiplicity of the voices we hear multiplies our response and divides our subjectivity." 59 The Text is production in the name of pleasure.
Toward an Erotics of Reading
But how does one read, which is to say produce, Texts? What are the contours of criticism as pleasure? "In short, can we legitimately speak," as an interviewer queried of Barthes in 1973, "of an 'erotics of reading'?" 60 Any attempt to answer these questions must proceed cautiously, must constantly guard against the temptation of method, for, as Barthes reminds us, "[there is] no surer way to kill a piece of research and send it to join the great scrap heap of abandoned projects than Method." 61 This cautionary note is all the more important to Communication Studies and its various sub-disciplines, which have shown a long preoccupation with method. 62 So, it is vital to affirm that an erotics of reading is a critical practice, a perspective, an attitude, not a critical methodology or technique. 63 In fact, it is a practice that eschews methodological rigor-a practice that "can produce only (Re)locating pleasure in media studies 203 theoreticians or practitioners, not specialists." 64 To claim that an erotics of reading is not a critical methodology is not also to claim that it lacks identifiable impulses, instincts, or sensibilities, however. The aim of this section, therefore, is twofold, to chart those sensibilities and to begin to suggest their productive potential. In my reading/writing of Barthes, an erotics of reading is characterized by three intricately interwoven sensibilities-significance, cruising, and drifting.
Traditional modes of criticism have, regardless of their object of study (television show or literary text), been concerned with signification and with the meaning of messages (what Barthes terms "works"). As we have already seen, privileging the Author-God furnishes a work with a final signified and closes down writing (textuality), making the critic's task an interpretive one-the recovery of meaning. 65 Although many contemporary critics are interested in questions of ideology, they nevertheless begin with the premises of interpretation and with the unquestioned assumption that the ideological workings of a discourse are decipherable (i.e., unified, static, and identifiable). When one begins speaking and thinking of language in terms of Texts rather than works, however, signification is displaced, for "the Text … answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination." 66 In this instance, "The critical activity," explains Rylance, "is described not as interpretation (still less as explication) but as an 'appreciation' of the plurality of writing." 67 For Barthes, such an appreciation for the "mobile play of signifiers, with no possible reference to one or several fixed signifieds" is known as significance. 68 To read a Text for significance is to read it intertextually, to disperse rather than to decipher its meaning. 69 "The critic," clarifies Wasserman, "does not decipher a text-for him [sic] , there is no single voice leading to a meaning. Criticism is the unraveling of the braided voices that traverse what is read." 70 I witnessed a powerful public performance of intertextual reading, of dispersal of the Text, during a panel at a recent academic convention. The panel concerned "Questions of Pleasure and Identity in Cultural Studies" and comprised predominantly theoretical pieces, except for the third paper, which undertook an analysis of the diverse "camp gestures" in the music, style, and personae of Gwen Stefani and Macy Gray. 71 The co-authors of this piece offered a careful and compelling analysis of Stefani's and Gray's many "references" to previous musical and fashion styles. But when they finished, and the floor was opened for discussion, an amazing and unexpected thing happened. Numerous hands excitedly thrust into the air, and with each turn, a new voice added to the list of "influences" on the two artists. At first, the authors of the paper seemed to be stunned (and perhaps even a bit defensive). They had, after all, done the "hard work" of interpreting the true influences on Stefani and Gray. But the audience's tone was playful, and any resistance to the unexpected readings quickly subsided. Audience members, it appeared, were deriving great pleasure from being able to make their own sets of connections. For several minutes, significance superseded signification, and individual voices and pleasures were woven into a vast Textual tapestry. As we are about to see, this sort of play is key to Text production and to jouissance. 72 Barthes approaches the notion of Textual play through two concepts, cruising and drifting. To understand what he means by these concepts, it is helpful to take a brief detour through childhood and, more specifically, theories of play. Although they share many commonalities, child and adult forms of play are nevertheless distinctive. 73 Child play, for instance, typically places greater emphasis on uninhibited freedom, individuality, creativity, pretending, enacting, and fantasy than does adult play. To children, objects and toys (especially those toys that they create) represent endless possibilities. 74 A box can be(come) a fort one moment and a truck the very next. As children grow into adulthood, however, they adopt/internalize cultural codes and norms-structures that impose limits on the meaning (and pleasure) of objects. Consequently, adults are more likely to use objects for their culturally intended or prescribed purposes. The freedom and creativity that children demonstrate with objects are also evident in the structure of their play. Whereas adults tend to play by the rules-rules that are preexisting and relatively fixed, children create rules as a form of play-rules that frequently change as quickly as do their desires. In short, children's play values immediate gratification and personal inventiveness over inherited tradition and predetermined cultural meanings. 75 Anthropologist Victor Turner classifies such fleeting, fragmentary, and imaginative forms of play as "liminoid phenomena" because they exist in/at a threshold, "an interval, however brief, of margin or limen, when the past is momentarily negated, suspended or abrogated, and the future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality when everything, as it were, trembles in the balance."
76 Liminoid phonemona such as child play generate sites/moments of jouissance, then, because the subject participates simultaneously in culture and its destruction. Cruising is Barthes's term for engaging language and discursive forms as children engage their social world. "Cruising is the voyage of desire," writes Barthes. "The body is in a state of alert, on the lookout for its own desire. … Cruising is an act that repeats itself, but the catch is absolutely fresh." 77 Rather than uncovering prescribed, culturally shared meanings, Barthes would have critics play imaginatively with a discourse, experiment and invent their own relationships with it, for when discourse is no longer received, no longer consumed, it becomes a resource for Text production, for pleasure. 78 "The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its own ideas-for my body does not have the same ideas I do." 79 Most communication and media critics are, of course, not very skilled at reading/ writing bodily desires, or even recognizing them when they occur. 80 They are interested in the text, only the text, which they then approach not as a Text at all, but as a work. So, how do critics open themselves to pleasure? One possibility is by appreciating drift. "My pleasure can very well take the form of a drift. Drifting occurs," observes Barthes, "whenever I do not respect the whole." 81 Barthes is suggesting that all discourses be treated as unfinished and that critics attend to the abrasions and ruptures that readers impose upon their surfaces. In an essay tellingly titled, "Writing Reading," he argues that drifting is a common (and frequently ignored) element in reading; "Has it never happened, as you were reading a book, that you kept stopping as you read, not because you weren't interested, but because you were: because of a flow of ideas, stimuli, associations? In a word, haven't you ever happened to read while looking up from your book?" 82 Barthes recognizes that discourses create structures (limits), but he also recognizes that readers disrespect and disrupt those structures by "pausing," "skipping," and "looking up" as they read. 83 Michel de Certeau shares a similar view of readers, arguing that the "reader … invents in texts something different from what they 'intended.' He [sic] detaches them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He combines their fragments and creates something un-known in the space organized by their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meanings." 84 Too often, critics give an account only of the system, the structure, and not how readers "wander through an imposed system"-how they write Texts. 85 Drifting (in Barthes's terms) and wandering (in de Certeau's terms) occurs in the space, the gap, the seam between language as structured and language as infinite, between the recognition of a final signified and an appreciation of the limitless signifier. This gap creates two surfaces, two edges-"one, a conformist edge, the language as culture decrees its use, the other, a subversive edge, the violation of convention." 86 It is the fault that is created between these two edges that is erotic, that delivers jouissance. 87 "Is not the most erotic portion of the body," Barthes inquires, "where the garment gapes?" 88 The pleasure of the Text "is not the pleasure of the corporeal striptease or of narrative suspense"-that pleasure is on the order of form (plaisir); rather, "it is intermittence," explains Barthes, "which is erotic: the intermittence of skin flashing between two articles of clothing (trousers and sweater), between two edges … it is this flash itself which seduces." 89 It is also this flash that subverts, that destabilizes subjectivity. In that moment, the subject participates paradoxically (as in paradoxa, beyond doxa) in the inherited bourgeois culture and in the destruction of this inheritance; the subject is split, divided between the consistency of her/his selfhood and its collapse, its loss. 90 The subject becomes a living contradiction-a perversion. Such perversions may not exist outside of ideology, but they cut it up, break it up, fragment it, and fragments are atopic, asocial, scandalous, because they do not prefer one ideology to another.
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On Conclusions, Fragments, and the Future of Media Studies
There is a certain irony in writing a conclusion about the productive potential of jouissance. Most conclusions in academic writing, especially those that are deemed "effective" or "good," summarize the argument, draw conclusions (preferably theoretical), and suggest several avenues for further research. Each of these maneuvers functions to celebrate the privileged position of the Author, to furnish a final signified, and to close down writing. If they are done particularly well, then an essay may even deliver plaisir. You see my dilemma. By "telling you" what I meant, I significantly limit the capacity of this writing to say anything more than what I meant. In fact, the "better" this conclusion (according to academic conventions), the more it contradicts the spirit of the Text. It is not the conclusion alone, however, that locates me in this paradoxical position. From the very outset, I have engaged in a mode of writing that does not lend itself well to Textual production. As a metacritical essay, this study, like other studies of Barthes, "remain[s] a language about the Barthesian language, and such a metalanguage cannot be a 'site' of pleasure [jouissance]," 92 for sites of jouissance are always sites of production. In reflecting on this matter, I have raised an interesting question, though; "can critics avoid this same paradox?" Barthes suggests they can, but only on one condition. The Text is, he argues, "outside criticism, unless it is reached through another text of bliss [jouissance]: you cannot speak 'on' such a text, you can only speak 'in' it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm the void of bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the letter of pleasure [plaisir] )." 93 This principle explains Barthes's own modes of writing in the poststructuralist portion of his life. In S/Z, Barthes undertakes an analysis of the short Balzac novella, Sarrasine, by "cutting up" the text into 561 "contiguous fragments" or lexias, which he admits "will be arbitrary in the extreme." 94 He, then, further divides the essay into 93 units bearing brief, cryptic titles, such as "The Unformulated Enigma" and "And/Or." The organization of Barthes's analysis reflects a deliberate attempt to "remain attentive to the plural of a text." 95 In A Lover's Discourse, Barthes partitions his discussion of love into 80 fragments or "figures," which he arranges alphabetically (i.e., randomly). 96 A similar approach is evident in The Pleasure of the Text, in which Barthes presents a succession of 46 short essays or "phylacteries," which range in length from two lines to several paragraphs. In each book, Barthes aims to disrupt and deny the cohesion of the discourse being studied, to open meaning, to appreciate the endless play of the signifier.
In Barthes's later books, there are no arguments, or at least no arguments in the traditional sense of argument. 97 Like composition, argument channels, directs, fixes meaning, shuts down textuality. So, instead, Barthes presents the reader with gaps, fissures, and ruptures. In doing so, he enacts, he performs, his argument. He disseminates rather than deciphers the discourse under study. And his perversion is doubly so, as his own writing offers fragments for future Textual production. One reads/writes Barthes precisely as he would have us read/write other discourses. Skipping and skimming different passages, reading fragments in new sequences, each reading of Barthes is a rewriting. What Barthes teaches us is that if criticism is going to be "productive," it must be a performed. For, if criticism is not a performance (a Textual production), it is a merely (passive) consumption, regardless of how critical it is of the discourse being studied. To explicate, to interpret, to "make clear" a discourse is to accept it on its own terms, and to repress the productive potential of jouissance.
I have suggested that media studies generally, and ideological criticism of media in particular, has lost sight of this. It has consistently approached discourses as closed systems, finished structures. It has transformed the practice of oppositional reading into method and stereotype, which, rather than dispersing a discourse and creating possibilities, fixes it, and passes judgment on it. In passing such judgments; ideological criticism has replaced one doxa with another, and become the latest (if more fashionable) site of ideological constraint. In light of these trends, I am urging media critics to explore reading as Text production in addition to text consumption, to experiment with a-positional reading in addition to oppositional reading, to perform discourse in addition to interpreting it, in short, to entertain an erotics of reading in addition to an aesthetics of reading. This will entail critics rethinking how they come to and write (about) media. Rather than doing a criticism of television shows and films, critics might construct media Texts from various fragments of our semiotic laden landscape. This would, no doubt, be closer to how many readers and audiences today actually interact with the endless mediascape. Rather than advancing highly focused arguments about Texts (which resist such closure/classification), perhaps media critics will enact their own voyages of pleasure and "invent social knowledge rather than discovering it." 98 Though it is unfashionable to end an essay with a quotation, I have in spite of this (or perhaps because of it) chosen to do so. I close with the parable that begins The Pleasure of the Text:
Imagine someone … who abolishes within himself [sic] all barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by syncretism but by simple discard of that old specter: logical contradiction; who mixes every language, even those said to be incompatible; who silently accepts every charge of illogicality, of incongruity; who remains passive in the face of Socratic irony … and legal terrorism. … Such a man would be the mockery of our society: court, school, asylum, polite conversation would cast him out: who endures contradiction without shame? Now this anti-hero exists: he is the reader of the text at the moment he takes his pleasure. 
